A “Long War” isn’t defined by a single battle or a short, sharp campaign. It’s measured in years — and it tests far more than frontline forces. It stresses supply chains, public services, critical national infrastructure, cyber resilience, political will, and society’s ability to absorb sustained disruption.
That’s the context behind General Sir Richard Barrons’ recent assessment of the UK’s preparedness — delivered in a talk at RUSI and reported by Forces News — in which he argued the UK is only around a quarter ready for the demands of a protracted, high-intensity conflict.
A changed strategic baseline: homeland risk is back on the agenda
The UK Government’s National Security Strategy 2025 is explicit that the homeland can no longer be treated as a sanctuary. It warns that the UK must prepare for the possibility of direct threat to the homeland in a wartime scenario — a notable shift in tone compared to much of the post–Cold War era.
Alongside the grinding war in Ukraine and increased “grey zone” activity, the implication is clear: resilience at home is now inseparable from deterrence abroad.
Barrons’ “Long War” test: where the UK is strongest — and where it isn’t
In Forces News’ reporting, Barrons frames “Long War” readiness as a practical, systems problem: whether the UK can sustain operations, recover from losses, and continue functioning under pressure — not just deploy forces for an initial response.
He highlights three areas in particular:
1) Medical capacity and casualty pathways
Barrons identifies medical as a top-tier strategic risk: the end-to-end pathway from battlefield injury to treatment capacity in the UK. Forces News reports a planning figure of hundreds of casualties per day, which immediately raises uncomfortable questions about surge capacity, logistics, prioritisation, and the knock-on impact on the NHS and wider civil resilience.
2) National resilience (infrastructure, cyber, public safety, and will)
“National resilience” is often discussed in general terms — but in a Long War it becomes brutally specific: energy reliability, transport continuity, telecoms, cyber defence, industrial throughput, public order, and the sustained confidence of the population that disruption can be endured and managed. Forces News reports Barrons scoring this area very low.
3) Protected command and control
Barrons is also sharply critical of the resilience and protection of key command-and-control nodes — the places from which operations are planned, directed, and coordinated. In a conflict where long-range strike, sabotage, and cyber effects are persistent features, protected C2 is not an abstract concept: it is foundational.
“Whole of society” readiness: deterrence isn’t just a military project
The argument that deterrence and endurance require broader participation is becoming mainstream across defence leadership.
Forces News points to senior voices emphasising that, without explaining risk clearly, it is difficult to build the public consent and political momentum required for difficult trade-offs — including investment choices and changes to preparedness behaviours across society.
This aligns with the wider direction of travel across Europe, where multiple countries are actively strengthening national participation models:
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France has announced a new voluntary national service initiative planned to begin in summer 2026, centred on paid training for young adults.
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Germany is moving to a model that begins with structured outreach to 18-year-olds from 2026, linked to a broader recruitment and readiness drive.
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Sweden continues public preparedness messaging via nationwide guidance distributed to households, reflecting a sober assessment of the security environment.
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Estonia has embedded defence-related training at school level, reinforcing a societal model of readiness.
Different countries, different histories — but a shared recognition: endurance is a national capability.
The hard question: what changes readiness at the pace required?
Forces News reports Barrons’ conclusion is not that the UK lacks analysis — it’s that implementation has not moved at the speed implied by the risk.
Investment is part of the equation. The Government has set out ambitions for higher defence and security-related spending over time, but independent scrutiny highlights the scale of the fiscal challenge. The Office for Budget Responsibility has estimated that reaching the Government’s commitment for defence spending levels would imply tens of billions of pounds in additional annual cost in today’s terms.
But money alone is not a strategy. Long War readiness also depends on:
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industrial capacity and munitions throughput
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workforce and skills pipelines
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logistics and stockpile management
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resilient communications and cyber defence
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clear national mobilisation planning
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tested local and regional contingency mechanisms
What this means for UK resilience and defence planning
A credible Long War posture is not about pessimism — it’s about deterrence through demonstrated capacity to endure. Barrons’ “quarter-ready” warning, as reported by Forces News, is best read as a prompt for action: turning strategy into delivery, and aligning defence outputs with the realities of modern conflict — where the homeland, critical infrastructure, and public confidence are all part of the battlespace.
This UDSS article is an original rewrite and commentary based on reporting by Forces News: “Just how ready is the UK for a long war? Former commander Barrons says we aren’t” by Sofie Cacoyannis, published 24 December 2025.
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