A defence capability earns its value through sustained operational use. That depends on trained people, reliable equipment, available spares, suitable infrastructure and decisions that keep the entire support system working.
When those elements fail to align, the consequences reach beyond maintenance budgets. Equipment spends longer unavailable. Training becomes harder to deliver. Commanders have fewer options. A force that appears capable on paper may struggle to generate the readiness or endurance required in practice.
The Do Differently, Do Better initiative (D3B) addresses this challenge. Presented in joint MOD–industry material as “Doing Support Better by Doing Support Differently”, it is directed by the Chief of Defence Logistics and Support, Vice Admiral Andy Kyte. Its stated challenges include equipment availability, obsolescence, workforce pressures, value for money and the agility of through-life support.
For Universal Defence and Security Solutions (UDSS), these are familiar issues at the intersection of strategy, operational delivery and organisational change. D3B’s relevance lies in the opportunity to improve how Defence sustains the capabilities on which its plans depend.
What D3B is seeking to change
Through-life support covers the arrangements needed to keep a capability usable throughout its service life. Decisions about maintenance, training, spares, technical information and upgrades begin influencing performance long before equipment reaches its first operational unit.
D3B’s published briefing identifies three central themes: developing people and support competence; strengthening supportability modelling and analysis; and giving the support function sufficient authority to influence decisions early and throughout programme delivery. Mark Willis is industry co-chair and Paul Salmon is MOD co-chair, with Team Defence Information facilitating the work.
The briefing also proposes demonstrating the value of existing modelling tools and strengthening the evidence used to assess support solutions. These are proposals and development priorities, rather than proof that the intended benefits have already been delivered.
Its focus is on tackling underlying governance and process problems. It highlights industry collaboration, Integrated Life Cycle Support, digital modernisation and AI as elements of the approach.
Together, these priorities will lead to meaningful improvement depending upon changing decisions, responsibilities and everyday working practices.
Why support belongs in the readiness debate
The UK’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 places warfighting readiness and the ability to sustain demanding operations at the centre of defence transformation. It also calls for a closer relationship with industry and renewed attention to the foundational capabilities that enable the Armed Forces to operate.
D3B is relevant to that ambition because readiness depends on the performance of the support system under realistic conditions.
A maintenance arrangement that works during routine training may face very different demands during a prolonged deployment. Equipment usage can increase, repair locations may change, supply routes may be disrupted and specialist personnel may be required in several places simultaneously.
Our assessment is that support reform should therefore be tested against explicit operational requirements. How much capability must remain available? For how long? At what tempo? Under which constraints?
Those questions give support investment a clear purpose. They also help decision-makers distinguish between a saving that improves efficiency and one that transfers cost or risk elsewhere.
Make the consequences visible before committing
Consider an illustrative procurement decision involving two equipment options. One has a lower purchase price but requires specialist maintenance facilities and a lengthy repair process. The other costs more initially but can be repaired closer to the user with more readily available skills.
The appropriate choice depends on the operational requirement and the full cost of delivering it. Purchase price alone cannot establish which option provides better value.
A practical assessment would examine expected reliability, repair turnaround, spares holdings, workforce requirements, training demands and the availability achievable under different operating conditions. It would also make uncertainty visible: which assumptions are supported by evidence, and which need testing?
For existing fleets, the same discipline can help identify where intervention would have the greatest effect. Additional stock may improve availability in one case; in another, the limiting factor may be repair capacity, technical information or the time taken to authorise work.
The value of analysis comes from identifying the constraint that actually governs performance.
Give support expertise influence over decisions
Technical knowledge has limited effect when the people holding it cannot influence programme choices.
A useful practical response to D3B’s authority theme is to define who owns each important support decision, what evidence they require and how unresolved concerns are escalated. The consequences of deferring a decision should be explicit.
For example, postponing a training solution may preserve a near-term programme milestone while leaving the receiving organisation unable to operate or maintain the equipment effectively. An unresolved data-access issue may later restrict repair options. A design change may create an additional maintenance burden that has not been resourced.
These dependencies need to appear in the programme’s decision process while there is still time to act.
For industry, early engagement should include candid discussion of support constraints and realistic delivery assumptions. For Defence, it should include a clear explanation of the operating conditions that suppliers are expected to support.
Develop people alongside technology
Digital tools can improve visibility and help teams compare options. Their usefulness depends on the quality of the information they receive and the judgement applied to their outputs.
An availability forecast, for example, can look precise while relying on optimistic assumptions about failure rates, repair times or staffing. Experienced practitioners are needed to challenge those assumptions and interpret what the results mean for operations.
A practical improvement programme should therefore assess skills alongside systems. Teams need to understand how engineering, logistics, commercial arrangements and operational demand affect one another. They also need opportunities to retain and share knowledge as experienced personnel move on.
AI applications should be tied to specific tasks and evaluated against a clear baseline. Possible uses include helping analysts organise maintenance information or identify patterns for further investigation. Any resulting recommendation still needs suitable assurance, accountable ownership and a route into an operational decision.
Where UDSS’s expertise is relevant
UDSS’s capabilities include defence policy and planning, military strategy, operational planning, organisation design, education and training, logistics support, infrastructure management, acquisition and digital transformation. That breadth is relevant to support reform because a problem visible in one function may originate in another.
Applied to the challenges raised by D3B, that expertise could help organisations:
- Translate operational ambitions into practical support requirements.
- Examine the organisational and supply chain dependencies affecting readiness.
- Clarify responsibilities and strengthen the decisions governing delivery.
- Develop workforce and training priorities alongside process changes.
- Assess whether proposed improvements address the underlying operational problem.
A productive engagement will begin with a defined issue and an agreed baseline. The output should be a practical set of decisions, responsibilities and measures that the organisation can use.
Judge progress by operational results
For organisations applying D3B’s principles, useful measures could include equipment availability, repair turnaround, time awaiting spares, maintenance backlog and the availability of qualified personnel. Costs should be assessed alongside those outcomes and the risks accepted.
A focused starting point would be to select a support problem with operational consequences, establish its causes, trial an intervention and measure the result. Successful changes can then be extended with evidence of what they require to work.
D3B creates an opportunity to ask harder questions about how capability is sustained. UDSS’s strategic and operational experience supports organisations to answer those questions and act on the findings.
To discuss how UDSS can support your organisation’s defence transformation, logistics or capability planning, contact the UDSS team.