It has become commonplace to say that we live in turbulent,uncertain and dangerous times. Europe is struggling with a much morethreatening continental military environment, dispelling the comfort of decadesof living free from fear of invasion or war that was underwritten by outsourcingso much deterrence and global stability to the US’ extraordinarily generoustaxpayers.
This change is unwelcome, so no surprise many policymakersand citizens seek comfort in denial, claiming this is a blip before normality (theworld as it was 1989-2014?) is restored. Denial is not surviving contact with recent global events – Ukraine,Gaza, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Venezuala, and Greenland – nor with the consistency of the rhetoric,policy documents and actions of the present US Administration.
The US National Defence Strategy (USNDS) published on 23 January2026 could hardly be clearer that the European security paradigm maintainedsince the end of the Second World War no longer exists. The US is no longerinterested in bailing out others where US interests are small, and the USthinks its interests in Europe are now small. Europe is an ‘economy of force’undertaking.
The four lines of effort in the USNDS are<spanclass=msofootnotereference><spanclass=msofootnotereference>[1]</spanclass=msofootnotereference></spanclass=msofootnotereference>:defend the US Homeland; deter China in the Indo Pacific through strength notconfrontation; increase burden sharing with US allies and partners; andsupercharge the US defence industrial base. The document affirms the priority of securing US military and commercialinterests in its hemisphere and establishing deterrence by denial along the FirstIsland Chain in the Pacific as the next priority.
Russia is a ‘persistent but manageable threat to NATO’seastern members for the foreseeable future’<spanclass=msofootnotereference>[2]</spanclass=msofootnotereference>. The document sets out what US leaders havebeen saying for at least 20 years: Europe has been able to spend its money on thingslike ‘public welfare and other domestic programs’ <spanclass=msofootnotereference>[3]</spanclass=msofootnotereference>becausethe US footed so much of the bill for NATO deterrence of Russia – adding,‘fortunately that is over now.’ It also describesthe economic disparity between Europe and Russia: ‘European NATO dwarfs Russiain economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power’<spanclass=msofootnotereference><spanclass=msofootnotereference>[4]</spanclass=msofootnotereference></spanclass=msofootnotereference>.Europe can’t argue with that.
The USNDS extols the success of President Trump in gettingEuropean NATO defence spending raised 3.5% GDP plus another 1.5% for defencerelated infrastructure. It doesn't dwellon which countries have seized on this already, like Poland and Germany, northe timescale, but the direction is that Europe must raise its game at thespeed the risks demand because the US is only delivering ‘critical but more limited’<spanclass=msofootnotereference><spanclass=msofootnotereference>[5]</spanclass=msofootnotereference></spanclass=msofootnotereference>support to allies that shoulder an appropriate burden.
The USNDS is painful, even unpalatable because it means Europemaking choices about public spending – either reducing expenditure on areasvoters favour and protect or raising taxes and borrowing more. The latter isnot easily viable for European economies - like the UK - stagnant for so longyet continuing to raise their welfare bill. Even for the fiscally constipated it’s not about affordability, because - to take the UK again as an example - addingperhaps £8-10 billion a year to a defence budget of around £67 billion from apublic sector of around £1.3 trillion in 2026 is about very hard and unpopularchoices. The money obviously exists.
There is an indisputable connection between the USNDS and theintractable struggle in Whitehall today over funding the 2025 SDR. Whatever thereal figures, there is a major gap between the re-costed SDR outcome and themoney the Government is currently choosing to provide. It includes the last Budget failing to beclear on how the money to hit 3.5% + 1.5% GDP in 2035 will be found. This is inanother parliament, but major defence commitments (such as to NATO) and theequipment contracts that support them need certainty over much more than 10years to be viable, trusted by industry, allies and acknowledged by opponents.
More challenging, however, is the chatter about the MoDbeing £28 billion short over the next four years. No amount of squeezing biscuits,cadet training and train tickets can find that sort of sum. If the staff are asking their leaders whetherthe answer is less SDR or more money sooner that sounds like a fair question.
Answering that question can be ameliorated by some agileprogramming, but the manoeuvre space for this is extremely limited given thelow readiness that the post-Cold War era left the armed forces in, amplifiedconsiderably by the new imperative to stay ahead of serious risks plainlyidentified and in the timescale they demand. As the US reduces its support, Europemust hope for a well-calibrated reduction not a plummet off a cliff, but thegap between requirement and resourcing is only going to widen. There is also a major role for privatecapital in closing the funding gap, especially in the more difficult earlyyears of the defence programme. The sooner these arrangements are in place (overcomingthe mixed experience of PFI) the better.
Nonetheless, even with some re-profiling of the programmeand the rapid deployment of private capital there is going to be a gap. The SDRIs in any case a de minimis solution as it had to match what needs to be doneto the money thought to be available. Thishas always entailed that many of the new capabilities and support for the armedforces as part of a revitalized NATO, plus addressing legacy holes after over30 years of reductions and hollowing out, will need yet more money – public andprivate - to fix. Speed matters too: theSDR is struggling to get into financial balance over 10 years whilst our Europeanallies say there is only three to five years to get ready, not ten. For the UK,finding say £28Bn for the SDR that was endorsed in June last year is likely justthe start of rebalancing between welfare and warfare.
The USNDS makes plain that the choice for the UK and most ofEurope is either to find more money for defence and sooner or rely on theboldness of denial and the generosity of opponents. The US cavalry isn’t coming any more.
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