This edition of the UDSS newsletter comes at a moment when the war involving Iran sits between negotiated de-escalation and the risk of major escalation, while Ukraine remains the defining security challenge for Europe. General Sir Richard Barrons reflects on what both conflicts reveal about the enduring nature of war, the rapidly changing character of modern warfare, and the urgent transformation required across defence, government, industry and capital.
First, there really are some skills that should be applied in deciding to threaten or use force. Generally, if these skills are used well things are likely to turn out better than if they are ignored or poorly used. We often talk, for example, about the necessity in strategy of balancing Ends, Ways and Means, and in the US-led war on Iran there is clearly some disconnection between how the objectives have or have not been clearly defined, the selection of the use of fires and blockade as the only routes to success, and the historically well proven limitations of power alone to deliver political outcomes such as regime change. These things are really perfect, but the closer they are to good enough the better the chances for achieving the outcomes being sought.
In both Ukraine and Iran, we are reminded that the enemy always gets a vote, and nobody should be surprised if that vote is selected as the worst-case outcome for the other side. Assuming or even just hoping that Iran would not close the Strait of Hormuz when attacked defies analysis over decades that this would occur, just as Russia attacking the survival of Ukraine would target the civilian population as much as the military - and this would be reciprocated by Ukraine doing as much inside Russia as possible to raise the price of the invasion.
Perhaps above all this, what we are seeing reminds us that the nature of war has never changed throughout human history. It seems to be part of how we are as a species, despite knowing well from history that once unlocked they really are no boundaries, safety nets, or guarantees of either immunity from terrible harm or even a minimally successful outcome. It also seems that understanding the nature of war as a basically bad thing to do moves cyclically across generations: those that have experienced it directly tend to see the folly of it and those that have only seen it on a screen showing events three generations distant can be inclined to see potential in it, even glamour.
On the other hand, these wars also show how profoundly the character, the way that war is fought changes constantly with circumstances, technology and thinking. The US and Israel between them have hit 30,000 targets in Iran and this would not be possible without the architecture of what we have come to call a Digital Kill Web (DKW). All forms of sensor are networked into a common database managed by AI (supervised by commanders and staff, at least for now) and linked to all means of causing effect, kinetic and non-kinetic. This is how targets can be identified, selected and struck at hitherto unimaginable speed and tempo for as long as there is ammunition.
In the DKW we also see the rapid evolution of navies, armies and air forces from the 20th Century pattern of people manning platforms such as ships, tanks and jets to a rapidly evolving mix of still some vital crewed platforms playing an essential role, but increasingly set behind uncrewed and ever more autonomous capability at the heart of the battle. In Ukraine, this accounts for the 40km zone between the warring parties where machines predominate, except perhaps in bad weather. In Iran, it is missiles and long-range drones that have struck the states neighbouring Iran - and even the US is bringing in more drones to complement its first-rate crewed platforms. Common to both theatres, forces are deploying a mix of very high-end munitions (like ballistic and cruise missiles) for the more difficult and longer range targets integrated with an ever greater number of low-end, cheap munitions that provide mass, deception and endurance.
In all this, and it absolutely reflects the conclusions of the UK’s 2025 SDR, massive transformational shifts are becoming plainer as a new global arms race is well underway. UDSS, since its inception, has always taken a leading role in the design and delivery of this transformation and it is our strongest USP today in how we support governments, armed forces, industry and capital work out their part in war in the 21st century.