A new report in The i Paper highlights mounting concern among chemical-weapons experts and senior defence voices that Russia’s alleged use of toxic agents in Ukraine risks pushing conflict further into chemical escalation.
At the heart of the story is a hard strategic point: international norms only deter when the people you’re trying to deter believe they apply to them — and fear the consequences of crossing them.
General Sir Richard Barrons, UDSS Co-Chair and a principal author of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), puts this bluntly. The West can spend endless time discussing what should be “off limits”, he says — but authoritarian states will decide for themselves, “under no obligation” to align with Western expectations.
And when leaders believe confrontation is approaching an existential level, Barrons cautions, the logic of restraint can shift dangerously: risk calculus changes, and actors can become prepared to do “more desperate things.”
The report pulls together expert commentary and open-source-attributed claims around chemical agent use and development, including:
Concerns that Russia may be continuing chemical-weapons research and could seek agents that are harder to detect, drawing on comments from a former Novichok scientist and other specialists.
Reporting that Western intelligence agencies have accused Russia of using large numbers of munitions containing riot control agents in Ukraine, and that the OPCW confirmed CS in samples linked to grenades found in Ukraine (while not attributing blame to either side).
A reminder that the UK’s SDR describes Russia’s chemical-weapons capabilities as an “enduring threat”, and calls for investment in “critical” defences — including making work on this an “essential and urgent” priority through a new Defence Research & Evaluation agency.
Barrons’ contribution matters because it’s less about chemistry — and more about strategy.
Yes, there are practical reasons chemical weapons can be unattractive on a battlefield (risk to your own troops, unpredictability, contaminated ground). But Barrons’ point is that those practical barriers are not the same thing as moral or legal restraint — and recent behaviour shows that we should not assume restraint will hold if a regime believes its grip on outcomes is slipping.
That distinction should shape how the UK, NATO and partners think about preparedness:
Deterrence must consider what an adversary believes they can “get away with”.
Resilience must assume boundary-pushing, not best-case compliance.
Attribution and response options must be credible enough to influence decision-making.
The SDR emphasis on urgent work to strengthen defences reflects a wider reality: chemical threats sit at the intersection of military capability, homeland resilience, health readiness, and industrial capacity.
That means preparedness isn’t one thing. It’s a system:
Detection and attribution that can support fast decisions and coalition alignment.
Operational readiness — equipment, training, and sustainment that work under pressure.
Civil resilience — planning and communication that reduce panic and protect continuity of essential services.
Industrial readiness — the ability to surge critical supplies, repair capability quickly, and adapt.
This post is a summary and commentary based on reporting by Rob Hastings in The i Paper (28 Dec 2025). For full detail, read the article here: https://inews.co.uk/news/world/tear-gas-novichok-putins-chemical-war-ukraine-escalating-4132448